I. INTRODUCTION
During the 2011 and 2012 legislative sessions, comprehensive immigration reform was once again a topic of vibrant debate and speculation in Congress, in the media, and in the legal academy. On June 27, 2013, the Senate passed S. 744, the "Border Security, Economic Opportunity, and Immigration Modernization Act." 3 Speculation abounded-and indeed continues to abound-as to what action, if any, the House of Representatives might take. But, as federal lawmakers and commentators argued the relative merits of different proposed solutions to cut visa backlogs, attract immigrants with skills in science and technology, and address the challenges posed by approximately 11.2 million undocumented migrants, 4 some of the most important stakeholders-the governments of the fifty states-were unusually silent. This was particularly noteworthy, because until the summer of 2012, those very state governments were often at the forefront of efforts to influence the reform of immigration law and policy; in 2010, for example, 346 separate bills pertaining to immigration and alienage were passed by state legislatures. 5 The catalyst for the change in states' immigration-related rulemaking was the United States Supreme Court's June 25, 2012 decision in Arizona v. United States, 6 which reasserted the federal government's primacy in the immigration arena and clarified the boundaries of federal, state, and local rulemaking pertaining to immigration enforcement and immigration-related criminal sanctions.
In the wake of the Arizona ruling, a number of states suspended immigration enforcement operations and ceased to promulgate antiunauthorized-immigrant laws. At the same time, immigration law scholars and commentators-some of whom had previously argued that it would be "conceptually unstable" to accord the federal government exclusive power over immigration enforcement, while allowing states and localities to "choose different methods of integrating immigrants" 7 -suggested that the Court's reaffirmation of federal primacy in the sphere of immigration enforcement signaled the demise of "immigration federalism," 8 or at the very least a return to state inaction in both immigration and alienage rulemaking. 9 I disagree. Arizona v. United States may mark a watershed in U.S. immigration law and policy, but it does not mark the end of state and local engagement in immigration regulation. Instead, it portends a "new" direction for "immigration federalism." The Arizona Court's reinvigoration of the doctrine of broad federal power in the immigration arena does not foreclose all state action pertaining to immigrants and immigration. Rather, the post-Arizona legal landscape provides ample opportunity for different varieties of state and local engagement with noncitizen residents-some of which will be novel and some of which will involve the further development or redirection of preexisting laws and policies. This "new immigration federalism" is and will be grounded in immigrant-inclusionary federalism. Parts IV and V of the Article then discuss the potential effect of the Court's recent immigration federalism doctrine on current and future regulation of immigrants by the federal, state, and local governments-in other words, these Parts sketch out the landscape of the new, post-Arizona, immigration federalism.' 7 Part IV discusses immigrant-exclusionary state and local rulemaking, including (i) expressly delegated direct enforcement, (ii) independent direct enforcement, and (iii) indirect enforcement measures that are undertaken both with and without delegation from the federal government. Part IV argues that, in light of Arizona v. United States and Chamber of Commerce v. Whiting, states' and localities' opportunities for promulgating their own direct immigration enforcement laws have been strictly curtailed, so that state and local indirect enforcement measures are no longer permissible.
Part V analyzes immigrant-inclusionary state and local rulemaking, including (i) comprehensive sanctuary ordinances, and (ii) education access legislation. Part V argues that now, more than ever, there are clear opportunities for states and localities to engage in various and different immigrantinclusionary measures, even when those measures may lead them to both complement and contradict federal government initiatives.
In sum, the Article proposes that Arizona v. United States does not signal the end of "immigration federalism," but rather its redefinition, redirection, and further development. The Court's decision limits states' and localities' ability to engage in immigrant-exclusionary lawmaking, but it also compels a new focus on states' and localities' continued ability to develop laws designed to foster immigrant inclusion. Such innovative lawmaking can and should be an integral part of the national debate about comprehensive immigration reform. The Article therefore concludes with observations on future challenges and potential opportunities posed by the new immigration federalism, within the broader context of comprehensive immigration reform.
II. (RE)DEFINING "IMMIGRATION FEDERALISM"
"Immigration federalism" is a freighted term. In this Article, I propose that "immigration federalism" be defined expansively as: "the engagement by national, state, and local governmental actors in immigration regulation." Such a broad definition departs somewhat from prior usage of the term. Although immigration law scholars have previously defined the term "immigration federalism" in a variety of ways,1 8 most have adopted narrow definitions that imply "immigration federalism" is synonymous with "immigration enforcement federalism."l 9 This is understandable, given the prominence of numerous antiunauthorized-immigrant laws and policies in several states and localities, such as Arizona's controversial Support Our Law Enforcement and Safe Neighborhoods Act ("S.B. 1070")2o or Hazleton, Pennsylvania's Illegal Immigration Relief Act. 2 1 But, a narrow definition paints an incomplete picture of state and local engagement in immigration-related rulemaking to date, and fails to account for the potential flourishing of immigrant-inclusionary lawmaking in the post-Arizona era.
enforcement as a defining component of "immigration federalism." Indeed, Professor Rodriguez claimed that it would be "conceptually unstable" for states to promulgate immigrant-inclusionary laws without also engaging in immigrant-exclusionary rulemaking. See Rodriguez, supra note 7, at 618. I contend that in the aftermath of Arizona this is no longer the case.
19 As a consequence of such narrow definitions, those scholars who are most concerned with discrimination against immigrants were perceived as being opposed to "immigration federalism." See, e.g., Huntington, supra note 18, at 789 n.7 (citing Wishnie, Laboratories, supra note 7, at 515-18, 527-28 as "describing discriminatory state laws passed pursuant to a federal law permitting states to determine eligibility of non-citizens for public benefits and anticipating more such laws in the next economic downturn"). Such commentators argued persuasively that devolving authority, particularly in the sphere of immigration enforcement, to state and local authorities could have a profoundly detrimental effect on immigrant (arguing that state and local police have no "inherent authority" to enforce federal immigration laws and that any enforcement authority they may have has been preempted by federal law), could NEWIMAHGRATIONFEDERALISM Indeed, for many years, immigrant-exclusionary measures have been far from the whole story of state and local engagement with local immigrant communities, and using the term "immigration federalism" in a narrowly proscribed manner ignores the multiplicity of existing forms of involvement by state and local actors in immigration-related rulemaking. 22 Just as some states and localities have long sought to exclude immigrants, others have long sought to welcome and include them, irrespective of the immigrants' legal status. Indeed, in the summer of 2012, in the days before the Arizona opinion issued, the California Senate passed a bill prohibiting state police and sheriffs officials from holding certain immigrant detainees pending deportation, 23 and the Mayor of Chicago proposed an ordinance barring city police officers from surrendering undocumented migrants without criminal records to federal officers. 24 The proliferation of widely divergent state and local legislation either constraining or promoting immigrants' employment, education, housing, access to government benefits, participation in civic life, and sentencing for criminal and immigration offenses 25 cautions against viewing "immigration federalism" as pertaining only to immigrant-exclusionary measures. Thus, any definition of "immigration. federalism" that focuses primarily on exclusion fails to capture fully the range of federal, state, and local lawmaking pertaining to immigrants and immigration. 26 A broad definition of "immigration federalism" is therefore needed to encompass involvement by multiple tiers of government-at the federal, state, and local levels-in the promulgation of laws and regulations implicating immigration and alienage that may pertain to either immigrant exclusion or 22 See infra Part V.
See Paloma Esquivel, Cahfornia Senate OKs Bill that Would Blunt Deportation
Efforts, L.A. TIMES, July 6, 2012, at AA1. 24Julia Preston & Steve Yaccino, Obama Policy on Immigrants Is Challenged by Chicago, N.Y. TIMES, July 11, 2012, at A14. 25 At one end of the spectrum, cities such as San Francisco have passed "sanctuary" ordinances refusing to participate in federal immigration enforcement and granting a bundle of benefits to undocumented residents. See S.F., CAL., ADMIN. CODE §12H.2 (2005). At the other end of the spectrum towns such as Hazleton, Pennsylvania have passed exclusionary ordinances stating that businesses that employ "illegal aliens" will be denied licenses and landlords that rent homes to such individuals will be fined $250, as well as declaring English the city's official language. Hazleton, Pa., Ordinance 2006-18; Hazleton, Pa., Ordinance immigrant inclusion. (Re)defining "immigration federalism" as "the engagement by national, state, and local governmental actors in immigration regulation," recognizes states' and localities' potential to engage both in antiunauthorized-immigrant rulemaking and in the promulgation of laws designed to foster immigrant inclusion. As this Article will demonstrate, such a broad definition is necessary to accurately capture the new direction of immigration federalism in the aftermath of Arizona and Whiting, wherein immigrantexclusionary rulemaking is broadly constrained, whilst immigrant-inclusionary lawmaking is not. This broad definition of "immigration federalism" also implicitly acknowledges that allowing the immigration debate to play out at multiple levels may provide an opportunity for a variety of different legislative and regulatory outcomes. 27 Immigration rulemaking, the enforcement of those rules, and dissent from those rules now implicate an increasingly complicated patchwork of federal-state, state-local, and in some instances even federallocal or federal-state-local relationships. As I discuss infra, in recent years, despite well-established doctrine mandating federal primacy, states have acted either under the supervision of the federal government, concurrently with the federal government, in competition with the federal government, or in dissent from the federal government to both exclude immigrants and to include them. 28 Moreover, the engagement by state and local governmental actors in immigration regulation does not necessarily involve state and local authorities acting in uniform ways to cooperate and coordinate their actions with those of the federal government. 29 The "new immigration federalism," in the postArizona legal landscape, may thus involve differentiated dissenting or uncooperative rulemaking by states and localities, 30 whether with respect to immigrant-exclusionary measures such as laws directing local police officers to 
III. THE NEW IMMIGRATION PREEMPTION DOCTRINE
The United States Constitution does not expressly define the scope of federal power to regulate immigration. 32 In the late nineteenth century, a series of United States Supreme Court cases delineated federal and state responsibility for regulating the lives of immigrants. 33 The Court's division of responsibility, which endures to this day, is predicated on a distinction between "immigration law" and "alienage laws." "Immigration law," i.e., legislation governing the selection, admission, and exclusion of noncitizens enshrined in the federal Immigration and Nationality Act ("INA"), 34 is the exclusive purview of the federal government, which enjoys vast or "plenary" power in this area. 35 In contrast, "alienage laws," which are laws that determine the rights, privileges, and obligations of noncitizens present in the United States, can, according to the 31 State enforcement of immigration laws is discussed in Part IV infra, state promulgation of sanctuary laws is discussed in Part V.A infra, and state DREAM Acts are discussed in Part V.B infra. 32 concern "what aliens shall be admitted to the United States, the period they may remain, regulation of their conduct before naturalization, and the terms and conditions of their naturalization"). Typical "immigration" laws include, for example, Section 1182 of the Immigration and Nationality Act, which sets forth the general classes of aliens "ineligible to receive visas and ineligible to be admitted," 8 U.S.C. § 1182 (2012) 39 which held that three of four contested provisions in Arizona's Support Our Law Enforcement and Safe Neighborhoods Act ("S.B. 1070")40 were preempted by federal law. Justice Kennedy's majority opinion rejects, on field and obstacle preemption grounds, all but one of the provisions at issue and reaffirms federal primacy in "immigration" rulemaking while concurrently permitting some measure of state "alienage" legislation. The provisions of S.B. 1070 at issue in the case were Sections 2(B), 3, 5(C), and 6 of the Act. Section 2(B) of S.B. 1070 requires state officers to make a "reasonable attempt . .. to determine the immigration status" of any person they stop, detain, or arrest on some other legitimate basis if "reasonable suspicion exists that the person is an alien and is unlawfully present in the United States." 42 The United States District Court for the District of Arizona preliminarily enjoined the entry into force of S.B. 1070 in 2010 on federal preemption grounds 4 7 and the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed that decision in 2011.48 The Ninth Circuit held that S.B. 1070 likely "subverts Congress's intent that systematic state immigration enforcement will occur under the direction and close supervision of the Attorney General" and "is inconsistent with the discretion Congress vested in the Attorney General to supervise and direct State officers in their immigration work according to federally-determined priorities." 49 The Ninth Circuit concluded that the Arizona statute was likely preempted because it prevents the uniform enforcement of federal immigration law envisaged by Congress, which "intended, and encouraged inter-governmental cooperation between state and federal borders." 5 3 It also emphasizes the "fundamental" importance, on foreign policy grounds, of a unified national immigration policy under federal control that enables foreign countries to communicate with one national government about immigration issues. 54 The opinion notes that this uniformity is particularly important with respect to immigration enforcement regulations and policies because "[t]he dynamic nature of relations with other countries requires the Executive Branch to ensure that enforcement policies are consistent with this Nation's foreign policy with respect to these and other realities." 5 5 Hence, the opinion suggests, the federal government enjoys "broad discretion" in determining whether and how to enforce immigration laws pertaining to immigrant selection, admission, and removal.
This conception of federal immigration regulation as a "harmonious whole" is evident throughout the Court's opinion in Arizona v. United StateS. 56 With respect to Section 3 of S.B. 1070, which creates a new state misdemeanor for failure to carry a federal alien registration document, the opinion holds that Congress has provided the full and only set of standards used to govern when and how immigrants must register with the federal government. 5 7 Therefore, any state regulations-whether more extensive than the federal scheme (like Section 3 of the Arizona law) or identical to the federal requirements-are impermissible under the Court's long established field preemption doctrine. 5 8 As a consequence, the opinion holds, states may not introduce their own alien registration schemes, even if they claim that they have the same aim as federal law and are designed-merely to complement, or mirror the federal scheme. 59 Nonetheless, the Court appears to be particularly concerned by the extent to which S.B. 1070 seeks to supplement the federal regulations by adopting a more punitive approach that might be at odds with federal policies and priorities. "Were [Section] 3 to come into force," the opinion notes, "the State would have the power to bring criminal charges against individuals for violating a federal 5 3 Id. at 2502. 54 and federal law with respect to penalties," 6 1 with the Arizona scheme precluding the more lenient sentence of probation or the possibility of an eventual pardon (which would be available under federal law).
Similar concerns pervade the Court's rejection of Section 5(C) of S.B. 1070, the provision creating a new state misdemeanor for undocumented immigrants who "apply for work, solicit work in a public place or perform work as an employee or independent contractor." 62 Under Section 5(C) such conduct is punishable by a fine of $2,500 and incarceration for a period of up to six months. 63 This provision of the Arizona Act exceeds the scope of the federal law governing immigrant employment, the Immigration Reform and Control Act of 1986 ("IRCA"), 64 which imposes sanctions on employers who knowingly hire undocumented workers, but which does not penalize the immigrant workers themselves. 65 The opinion holds that this distinction in the federal Act was crucially important, stating that "[t]he legislative background of IRCA underscores the fact that Congress made a deliberate choice not to impose criminal penalties on aliens who seek, or engage in, unauthorized employment." 66 Thus, the opinion concludes, Section 5(C) of S.B. 1070 "would interfere with the careful balance struck by Congress with respect to unauthorized employment of aliens," 6 7 and would therefore be "an obstacle to the regulatory system Congress chose." 68 As such, the Court held, Section 5(C) was preempted by federal law.
The Court's concern that the Arizona statute conflicted with the federal government's established priorities and policies was also evident in its ruling that Section 6 of S.B. 1070 was preempted. According to the Court, Section 6, which permits a state police officer to arrest, without a warrant, any individual whom the officer has probable cause to believe is removable, 69 "violates the principle that the removal process is entrusted to the discretion of the Federal Government." 70 The opinion notes that, as a general rule, it is "not a crime for a removable alien to remain present in the United States," 7 1 but rather a civil violation, and that the federal statutory structure determines when it is appropriate to arrest an alien during the removal process. The opinion states that Section 6 of the Arizona Act nonetheless "attempts to provide state officers with even greater authority to arrest aliens on the basis of possible removability than Congress has given to federal immigration officers." 72 The latitude given to state police and sheriff's officers under Section 6 to conduct a warrantless arrest on the basis of belief that an alien had committed any "public offense," without regard to the alien's flight risk or to the federal interest in the alien's detention, is therefore an impermissible usurpation of the federal prerogative to determine enforcement priorities. "This would allow the State to achieve its own immigration policy," the opinion notes disapprovingly, 73 which "is not the system Congress created." 74 The opinion concedes that there were circumstances in which federal-state cooperation in immigration enforcement was both permissible and desirable, 7 5 but that while there may be "some ambiguity" as to what might constitute cooperation in enforcement operations under the federal law, "no coherent understanding of the term would incorporate the unilateral decision of state officers to arrest an alien for being removable absent any request, approval, or other instruction from the Federal Government." 76 The Court was particularly concerned that unilateral action by state police or sheriffs officers could lead to the unnecessary arrest and detention of certain classes of undocumented immigrants, such as veterans, college students, or individuals assisting with criminal investigations, whom federal officials would not wish to arrest or remove. 77 Notwithstanding its apparent concern that state officers acting under cover of Section 6 of S.B. 1070 might act precipitously to arrest certain types of undocumented immigrants, the Court declined to hold that the remaining contested provision of S.B. 1070, Section 2(B), was preempted on its face by federal law. 78 Colloquially known as the "show me your papers" provision, Section 2(B) requires state police and sheriffs officers, whenever they make any arrest for any suspected violation of any law and have "reasonable suspicion" to believe that the individual is an undocumented immigrant, to detain that individual until they can check his immigration status. 79 The Court speculated as to how Section 2(B) might be implemented and suggested that even in situations in which Arizona police and sheriffs officers contact ICE about immigrants whom the Attorney General does not wish to remove, "Congress has done nothing to suggest it is inappropriate to communicate with ICE." 84 In so doing, the Court drew an explicit parallel with its 2011 ruling in Chamber of Commerce v. Whiting 85 in which it held, inter alia, that the state of Arizona could permissibly require employers to communicate with the federal government using the latter's "E-Verify" database to determine whether potential workers were eligible for employment. 86 The Court noted, however, that the continued vitality of Section 2(B) of S.B. 1070 would be dependent upon its practical operation and thus on whether the Section 2(B) mandate is interpreted narrowly or expansively. Officers acting under their Section 2(B) authority could potentially detain immigrants without sufficient justification or for too lengthy a period of time. The federal government did not, however, challenge the law on Equal Protection grounds, and thus the Court did not consider the potential for racial 80 1d. at 2510. 8 1 d. In so ruling, the Court noted that because the provision has not yet entered into practical operation, state courts have yet to interpret its scope. Pointing to language in the Act prohibiting police officers from considering race or national origin in enforcing the law, the Court suggested that racial profiling might not occur. 
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profiling of immigrants by Arizona officers, although it stated explicitly that future suits addressing this issue were not precluded by its ruling. 87 Indeed, the Court made clear that this decision was not intended to resolve any other constitutional challenges, including "as applied" challenges to Section 2(B) that might be brought after the law goes into effect. 88 Some commentators have interpreted the Arizona v. United States majority opinion as a victory for the federal government and for immigrants' rights advocates. 89 Others view the opinion as a triumph for Arizona and the other states seeking to introduce tighter regulation of the immigrants living within their borders. 90 My own view is that this is not a clear-cut victory for either side. The opinion leaves open the possibility for expressly delegated action by state law enforcement personnel and provides for state officers to make independent inquiries into individuals' immigration statuses and to detain such individuals under the auspices of Section 2(B). Nevertheless, the opinion does arguably favor the federal government's arguments about its plenary occupation of the immigration field, and has firmly limited any independent state rulemaking pertaining to immigration enforcement. Some scholars have suggested that the opinion is too vague, characterizing it as the latest of a series of abstract and unclear immigration rulings by the Court that assert the federal government's plenary power over immigration without clearly defining the connection between absolute federal sovereignty and the Court's preemption analysis. 9 1 I believe, however, that the central tenets of the opinion are sound and clear; states may not engage in anti-unauthorized-immigrant rulemaking when such action intrudes upon the federal government's plenary power to determine "immigration" law. 92 But, as I discuss infra, this limitation leaves open the opportunities for state and local rulemaking pertaining to immigrantinclusionary "alienage" laws, because the opinion is silent as to such regulation. The significance of the Supreme Court's ruling in Arizona v. United States for the future direction of immigration federalism cannot be overstated. For the first time since the introduction of the Arizona statute, and similar ("copycat") laws in Utah, 93 Indiana, 9 4 Georgia, 95 Alabama, 9 6 and South Carolina, 97 the Court has spoken definitively as to the extent to which states and localities may promulgate laws and initiatives involving immigration enforcement measures. As I discuss in Part IV infra, a plain reading of the Court's doctrinal analysis in Arizona v. United States is that the states' ability to legislate in this arena have been severely curtailed, if not entirely prohibited. Arizona v. United States thus provides a clear rule as to the outer limits of "immigration" rulemaking. Chamber of Commerce v. Whiting similarly delineates the boundaries of state "alienage" legislation, although the boundaries set by the Court in Whiting were subsequently clarified by the Court's Arizona ruling.
B. Chamber of Commerce v. Whiting and Alienage Laws
Chamber of Commerce v. Whiting was brought by a coalition of businesses and immigrants' advocates, with the support of the Obama Administration, in response to the passage in 2007 of the Legal Arizona Workers Act ("LAWA"). 98 LAWA imposes heavy penalties, including the loss of an operating license, on businesses that intentionally or knowingly hire undocumented workers and requires that Arizona businesses use the federal EVerify 99 database to check the immigration status of potential employees. 0 0 The Supreme Court ruled that LAWA was not preempted because it was a permissible exercise of state powers to regulate its residents-in other words, because it was a permissible "alienage" law. The Court's holding had two bases. First, the Court held that the law is grounded in the state's licensing provisions, which "fall squarely within the federal statute's savings clause,"' 0 ' and second, the Court held that the law does not otherwise conflict with federal law.1 02 The Court emphasized that LAWA "closely track[ed]" the federal law, including its incorporation of a good-faith compliance defense and that it did not upset the balance that IRCA created between different competing governmental interests. 103 The Court suggested that LAWA maintained that balance because its sanctions were for egregious violations only and, as such, did not exceed in severity those of the federal scheme and because LAWA's requirement that employers use the federal E-Verify database would minimize potential conflicts with federal law.1 04 It is worth noting that LAWA, an ostensible "alienage" law, has very real "immigration" law consequences. It reduces the incentive for employers to hire undocumented workers and therefore indirectly discourages undocumented individuals from remaining in Arizona. Laws imposing similar employersanctions, modeled on Arizona's LAWA, were also passed in a number of other states. 105 In the immediate aftermath of Chamber of Commerce v. Whiting, some commentators suggested that not only would such state laws designed to restrict the employment of immigrants be permitted to go into effect, but also that local ordinances designed to restrict immigrants' access to housing or benefits, such as the so-called "Illegal Immigrant Relief Acts" ("IIRAs") passed in Hazleton, Pennsylvania and Farmers Branch, Texas, might even be permissible.1 06 Such an argument was predicated on the notion that, under Whiting, in the absence of a clear statement of federal law on a given issue, states and cities were permitted to legislate in the interstices.
The Court's ruling in Arizona v. United States, however, substantially reframes the precedent of Whiting, both in the narrow context of immigrant employment and in the wider context of other indirect enforcement laws. 107 The Court's rejection of Section 5 of S.B. 1070, which penalizes undocumented immigrant workers, not employers, signals clearly that Whiting's rule will not be expanded in any way. Moreover, the Arizona Court actually emphasizes key points made by the Whiting dissenters, such as "the careful balance struck by Congress with respect to unauthorized employment of aliens" in IRCA and the "comprehensive" framework provided by the federal law.' 0 8 The Court's emphasis on the comprehensive nature of the federal scheme, both in terms of whom it penalizes (employers) and whom it does not (workers), has farreaching implications for the IIRA lawsuits. The Arizona ruling suggests that in the IIRA context, as in the employment context, the absence of action by the federal government does not allow state or local actors to take their own unilateral action designed to penalize immigrants or to enforce immigration laws or policies, for to do so would be to disrupt the delicate balance that Congress has struck within the complex federal scheme. Under the new framework of immigration federalism, therefore, while there may be some room in the future for states to pass their own anti-unauthorizedworker "alienage" legislation akin to Arizona's LAWA that punishes employers, there is no broad authority for wider-ranging action against immigrants that exceeds the preexisting boundaries of the comprehensive federal framework. In the next Part, I discuss the likely effect of these new constraints on state action on existing or pending state and local immigrantexclusionary legislation.
IV. THE NEW IMMIGRATION FEDERALISM AND IMMIGRANT EXCLUSION
The Supreme Court's recent immigration preemption doctrine effectively precludes states passing their own anti-unauthorized-immigrant "immigration" laws. Although some state legislators may fear that this curtailment of their lawmaking powers will herald a permissive era of amnesty and laissez-faire acceptance of undocumented immigrants, all available evidence suggests that the opposite is true. Under the Obama Administration, federal immigration authorities have carried out record numbers of deportations, with over 400,000 immigrants removed from the United States in 2009 and 2010, and with the Department of Homeland Security set to deport two million immigrants by 201 4-approximately the same number of immigrants who were deported in the 105 years from 1892 to 1997. 109 Despite this extraordinary record of immigration enforcement activity, since President Obama took office, according to the National Conference of State Legislatures, a record number of immigration-related laws were passed by state governments, including thirty-seven pertaining to state participation in immigration enforcement. immigration laws excluding individuals from entry to the United States is not a new phenomenon,"' but state involvement grew exponentially in the early years of the twenty-first century.11 2 This growth involved a plethora of state laws authorizing direct enforcement of federal "immigration laws," whether under so-called 287(g) agreements with ICE delegating authority to do so, 1 1 3 or under independent state initiatives such as Arizona's S.B. 1070.114 At the same time a wide range of exclusionary "alienage" laws pertaining to the treatment of immigrants were introduced, limiting immigrants' access to housing, employment, or language, and effectively serving an indirect enforcement function." 5 This Part of the Article discusses these various iterations of state and local immigrant-exclusionary rulemaking. It considers, in light of the new direction for immigration federalism, the continued vitality of state and local involvement in (1) expressly delegated direct enforcement, (2) independent direct enforcement, and (3) indirect enforcement measures that are undertaken both with and without delegation from the federal government. The Article contends that under the new immigration federalism, States' and localities' engagement in any form of independent direct enforcement has been strictly curtailed and that many indirect enforcement measures will no longer be permissible.
A. Expressly Delegated Direct Enforcement
Many states and localities are actively involved in the direct enforcement of federal immigration laws pursuant to an agreement with the federal authorities that delegates responsibility for the enforcement of such laws.11 6 The two primary vehicles by which the federal government has delegated direct collaboration with federal law enforcement agencies, processes for immigrant detention, prevention of child abduction, and responsibilities of law enforcement officers.").
Ill For example, the former Alien Criminal Apprehension Program (ACAP), through which states worked with the federal government to apprehend immigrants convicted of (g)(1).") . The Secure Communities database is accessible via ICE's Law Enforcement Support Center ("LESC"), which operates "24 hours a day, 7 days a week, 365 days a year" and provides, among other things, "immigration status, identity information and real-time assistance to local, state and federal law enforcement agencies. (g)(3) ).
the duties of an immigration officer.1 32 It suggested that such certification was further evidence of the efficacy of 287(g) as a tool of directly delegated enforcement power.1 33 The Court described other statutorily specified circumstances in which state and local police officers might exercise immigration enforcement powers, subject to direct federal control, namely in the event of an "imminent mass influx of aliens off the coast of the United States," or in specific circumstances after consultation with the federal government, or in specific instances in which an individual has smuggled or harbored certain immigrants.1 34 According to the Court, the federal government could also permissibly delegate its immigration authority to state personnel acting in cooperation with federal immigration officers as part of a joint task force or providing operation support in the execution of a federal warrant. 135 Similarly, it could delegate its authority to state officials to enable them to provide federal immigration officers access to detainees held in state facilities or to assist the federal government by responding to federal requests for information about immigrant detainees held in their custody.1 36 In other words, under the new immigration federalism regime, state actors proceeding under the direct supervision (variously construed) of federal immigration officers may continue to engage in immigration enforcement.
Shortly after the Court rendered its judgment in Arizona v. United States, the federal government revoked its existing Section 287(g) agreements with seven separate Arizona law enforcement agencies.' 3 7 In so doing the administration stated that it did not intend for Arizona's immigration policies to become the Department of Homeland Security's policies.1 38 This turn of events suggests another potential consequence of the Supreme Court's reinvigorated immigration preemption doctrine-renewed confidence on the part of the federal government that it can and should crack down not just on independent 
B. Independent Direct Enforcement
Arizona is just one state among many that have, during the last few years, considered and/or adopted independent state ordinances requiring law enforcement officers to question individuals about their immigration status or to arrest suspected undocumented immigrants. Although Arizona's S.B. 1070 has garnered the most media attention, five other states-Utah, Georgia, South Carolina, Alabama, and Indiana-enacted legislation that either mirrored or exceeded the Arizona statute. 139 Moreover, at the time of writing, such legislation is still pending in five other states-Wisconsin, Illinois, Michigan, Pennsylvania, and Ohio.1 40 In the wake of the Court's ruling in Arizona v. United States the future of these state laws appears short-lived. It seems highly unlikely that any of these state laws, either enacted or pending, will survive in their current form following the Supreme Court's decision in Arizona v. United
States. The developments in Alabama presage the outcomes of the Utah, Georgia, South Carolina, and Indiana lawsuits opposing the implementation of the various independent immigrant-exclusionary laws. It seems clear that those provisions that mirror completely the sections of S.B. 1070 that the Supreme Court ruled preempted will be struck down immediately, while other nonequivalent provisions will be subjected to more searching review. In Indiana, for example, the state Attorney General has already conceded that key portions of S.B. 590, the state's "anti-illegal immigration law," are now preempted 161 See Moreno, supra note 160 (Attorney General Shurtleff explained that he believes that the relevant difference between the two Acts is that Utah's provision requires legal status to be checked only after an arrest on a felony or a class A misdemeanor, i.e., in narrower circumstances that are thus distinct from S.B. 1070's broad mandate). 
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federalism, any state laws creating new state immigration-related crimes, mandating state officers to enforce federal immigration laws without direct delegation from the federal government, or requiring immigrants to produce special registration documents are prohibited.1 65 The Court's express rejection of the "mirroring" theory that was the cornerstone of all six states' independent enforcement statutes also precludes states from introducing other immigrationrelated regulations designed to "mirror" the federal statutory scheme.1 66 State laws that, similar to Arizona S.B. 1070 Section 2(B), require state officers in the course of a legitimate arrest or detention to inquire into individuals' immigration status appear set to survive in the short-term, although under the new framework of immigration federalism the long-term viability of such laws is questionable, at best. Immigrants' advocacy groups have already filed new suits arguing that these laws will likely lead to impermissible racial profiling, which may delay their implementation.1 67 Moreover, should the laws go into effect, "as applied" challenges will also surely be brought, with potentially farreaching effect.1 6 8 Under the new immigration federalism, therefore, the opportunity for states to engage in independent direct enforcement of immigration laws is substantially curtailed and may be restricted even further in the near future.
C. Indirect Enforcement
During the same period that some states and localities promulgated "attrition through enforcement" laws requiring the direct enforcement of federal immigration law by state agencies, other communities enacted provisions designed to enforce federal immigration law indirectly. Chief among these immigrant-exclusionary measures were the so-called "Illegal Immigrant Relief Acts" ("IIRAs"), the first of which was proposed in San Bernardino, California "to let, lease, or rent" or "suffer or permit the occupancy" of a dwelling unit by an "illegal alien" is prohibited and "shall also be deemed to constitute harboring").
173 Escondido, Cal., Ordinance 2006-38 § § 1(3), 16E-1 (Oct. 18, 2006) (declaring it unlawful for the owner of a dwelling unit to "harbor" an "illegal alien" and defining "harboring" as "to let, lease, or rent a dwelling unit to an illegal alien" or "[t]o suffer or permit the occupancy of the dwelling unit by an illegal alien"). 1 74 See Nash, supra note 115, at 248, 249 n.27. The latest iteration, which requires the city buildings inspector to "verify with the federal government" that every noncitizen renting a dwelling is "an alien lawfully present in the United States," was enjoined, on preemption grounds, by the federal district court and by a three-judge panel of the Fifth Circuit.1 87 The en banc panel heard oral arguments on September 19, 2012, and issued its Under the new doctrinal framework for immigration federalism set forth by the Supreme Court in the Arizona and Whiting cases, the Third and Fifth Circuit panels had no choice but to strike down the Hazleton and Farmers Branch ordinances. Although the Hazleton and Farmers Branch IIRAs do not track the Court's Arizona ruling as directly as the Alabama and Indiana "copycat" immigration enforcement laws, the restrictions that both towns placed on renting homes arguably detract from the "harmonious whole" of the scheme for immigrant admission and exclusion, substituting local judgment for that of the federal government. Moreover, the Arizona Court, in holding Sections 3, 5(C), and 6 of S.B. 1070 preempted, counseled against any action that might constitute "harassment of some aliens ... whom federal officials determine should not be removed." 1 90 Unlike the LAWA sanction of employers, which the Whiting Court held to be permissible "alienage" regulation, direct action against immigrant tenants is surely the kind of "harassment" of noncitizens contemplated in Arizona. Thus, these housing-related indirect enforcement initiatives, and others like them, are unquestionably foreclosed by the new postArizona framework for immigration federalism. This is not to say that there are now no avenues remaining for states to enact indirect enforcement provisions. The immigration and welfare laws of 1996, for example, expressly delegated to the states authority to enact some indirect enforcement regulations, including those that prohibit access to public benefits.' 9 1 Other immigrant-exclusionary state laws, such as those pertaining to medical care, welfare benefits, or in-state tuition eligibility, have also been grounded in this express delegation.1 92 Such measures have proliferated in recent years,1 93 and, as in the direct enforcement context, may be permissible 
V. THE NEW IMMIGRATION FEDERALISM AND IMMIGRANT INCLUSION
State and local "alienage" laws designed to welcome, integrate, and include immigrants play an increasingly important, but hitherto underexplored role in U.S. immigration law and policy. While some states have developed exclusionary statutes and regulations pertaining to immigrants, especially undocumented immigrants, other states and localities-including individual localities within immigrant-exclusionary states-have promulgated laws designed to foster the inclusion and integration of all immigrants into their local communities. 194 It is not possible to discuss in this Article all of the myriad inclusionary measures adopted in different locales throughout the United States. This Part therefore focuses on two examples of local and state immigrantinclusionary provisions that have proliferated since the mid-1990s: (1) so-called sanctuary laws, designating areas (usually cities) as "sanctuaries" from immigration enforcement and providing all residents, regardless of immigration status, with equal access to local governmental services; and (2) in-state tuition initiatives and other measures designed to provide immigrant youth with equal access to higher education. This Part argues that while the new immigration federalism curtails states' and localities' ability to engage in immigrantexclusionary lawmaking, it simultaneously creates opportunities for states and localities to promulgate laws designed to foster immigrant inclusion. 
A. Comprehensive Sanctuary Ordinances
Since the late twentieth century, a number of American cities and towns have adopted "sanctuary laws."l 9 5 These provisions-whether statutes, resolutions, ordinances, or executive orders-were initially designed to curtail state and local police from engaging in the enforcement of federal immigration laws,1 96 but they have subsequently evolved to encompass the provision of a number of services to immigrant communities (including the undocumented members of those communities) on par with those provided to U.S. citizen residents.1 97 Although sanctuary laws are unquestionably controversial,1 98 their evolution from a means of signaling expressive dissent from federal government policy to an integrated regulatory scheme for the inclusion of immigrants into their local polity 99 is an integral component of the new immigration federalism.
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The sanctuary movement in the United States began in the late 1970s and grew during the 1980s, as churches and other affiliated organizations re-invoked the medieval privilege of "sanctuary" 20 1 or safe haven for nationals of Guatemala and El Salvador who faced deportation to countries riven by civil war. 202 A number of cities, such as San Francisco, supported this movement by passing resolutions stating that asylum-seekers from Guatemala and El Salvador need not fear arrest and deportation within their jurisdictions. 203 In time, these measures became increasingly generalized, evolving from a prohibition on immigration enforcement against Guatemalan and Salvadorian refugees and asylum-seekers, to a prohibition against discrimination by city officials on the basis of immigration status of those refugees and asylum seekers, and then to an 199 This evolution does not, of course, preclude the current array of comprehensive sanctuary ordinances from also fulfilling a valuable dissent function-indeed, such ordinances continue to communicate a state's or municipality's dissatisfaction with federal immigration requirements.
2 00 See Bulman-Pozen & Gerken, supra note 30, at 1259.
0 1 See generally KARL SHOEMAKER, SANCTUARY AND CRIME IN THE MIDDLE AGES,
400-1500 (2011) (describing sanctuary protections in the western legal tradition). eventual prohibition against any form of discrimination on the basis of immigration status against any immigrant individual. 204 In the 1990s and early twenty-first century, cities without ties to the original sanctuary movement of the 1970s and 1980s, such as Durango, Colorado 205 and Trenton, New Jersey, 206 also began to enact ordinances prohibiting discrimination on the basis of immigration status, limiting disclosure of residents' immigration status by city authorities, and offering public services, including municipal identification cards, to undocumented migrants. To date, almost seventy different U.S. jurisdictions, ranging from the State of Alaska to the City of New Haven, Connecticut, have promulgated local rules prohibiting local police officers from inquiring into an individual's immigration status and preventing discrimination on the basis of immigration status. 2 07 Commentators have offered a variety of different explanations for why so many cities have recently enacted sanctuary ordinances. One suggestion is that the sanctuary laws constitute a backlash against initiatives by federal Immigration Customs and Immigration Enforcement ("ICE") to co-opt local law enforcement officers to perform immigration functions. 20 8 Indeed, many of the most trenchant critiques of the 287(g) program have been employed to justify sanctuary ordinances. 2 09 For example, the concern that 287(g) agreements discourage immigrant communities from cooperating with police because individuals fear that they will be at risk of removal if they report crimes is countered by the suggestion that sanctuary ordinances actively encourage immigrant victims of crime to come forward. 2 10 Another explanation for the increase in sanctuary ordinances is that ICE home and workplace raids during the later years of the Bush Administration alienated sufficient numbers of U.S. citizens to create a groundswell of popular support for sanctuary initiatives. 208 Cristina Rodriguez, for example, suggests that many sanctuary resolutions served as "direct legislative and administrative responses to the federal government's expanding efforts to enlist state and local police voluntarily in the enforcement of immigration laws in the years after the attacks of September 11, 2001." Rodriguez, supra note 7, at 601. 209 See Michaud, supra note 114, at 1101 (noting that " [v] arious cities and agencies have assumed this logic in their adoption of 'sanctuary laws' and policies"). of violations of immigrants' and citizens' constitutional rights during ICE raids, in particular the negative impact on U.S. citizen children, received extensive negative media coverage 2 12 and prompted a congressional investigation into the raids. 2 13 It is thus certainly possible that the sanctuary ordinances of the early twenty-first century evolved in part as a reaction against aggressive federal enforcement initiatives.
An alternative, and perhaps complementary, explanation for the rise of sanctuary laws as an expression of inmigration federalism lies in the increasingly sophisticated roles and identities of "sanctuary cities" themselves and of the individuals who constitute them. In 1979, when the City of Los Angeles adopted Special Order 40, its sanctuary ordinance, it claimed that it was doing so because of "social issues involving problems of health, welfare, education, housing, and employment which are related to the assimilation of large numbers of persons with varied cultural heritages. for individual immigrants' rights because they have become focal points for "immigrant diasporas of various types and from around the world" who are drawn to such cities in search of employment. 22 1 Professor Rodriguez's argument explains, to some extent, the sanctuary laws adopted by cities like New York that have economies that are dependent upon immigrant workers, including undocumented laborers. 222 It may also account, in part, for the promulgation of sanctuary laws in locales such as New Haven, Connecticut or Cambridge, Massachusetts, which are home to major universities and are therefore more likely to be ports of entry for diverse immigrant groups. 223 The development of sanctuary laws in towns like Aztec, New Mexico, 2 24 Durango, Colorado, 2 25 and Ashland, Oregon, 226 is less easily explained in these terms, however, because they are not traditional ports of entry to the United States. These smaller cities often have smaller immigrant communities, composed primarily of migrants who have followed family members or neighbors from their hometown who previously immigrated to the United States. 227 The proliferation of sanctuary ordinances in cities of varying sizes suggests that global reach is not the only determinant of whether or not a locale will adopt a sanctuary law, 228 but rather merely one factor among others, including (but not limited to) the diversity of the city's population, the degree of political support for immigrant communities (either a city's own immigrants or in solidarity with others elsewhere), and the established ties between documented and undocumented immigrant groups. 229 Moreover, during the summer of 2012, both "vertical" and "horizontal" uncooperative federalism concerns appear to have animated some locales' decisions to bolster existing sanctuary measures. 230 On July 9, 2012, during the same week that the Governors and Attorneys General of Arizona, Alabama, Utah, Indiana, Georgia, and South Carolina emphasized their continued commitment to "attrition through enforcement" measures, Chicago Mayor Rahm Emanuel announced that he would propose a city-wide ordinance barring Chicago police officers from turning over undocumented immigrants to federal agents, provided the immigrants had no serious criminal convictions or outstanding criminal warrants. 23 1 Mayor Emanuel's announcement coincided with both increased media scrutiny of Arizona-style independent enforcement laws and with federal criticism of an existing Cook County, Illinois sanctuary ordinance. 2 32 During the same week, the California Senate passed the Trust Act, a bill designed to limit the reach of Secure Communities on a statewide level. 233 The Act precluded state officers from collecting information about noncriminal immigrants. Significantly, advocates for the bill explicitly stressed its signaling role within the context of the disparity between immigrant-exclusionary and immigrant-inclusionary states. "Arizona and its governor may view all immigrants as criminals . . . but in California we have a different view," explained one of the bill's proponents. 234 Furthermore, when California Governor Jerry Brown vetoed the Trust Act in October 2012, the Police Chief of Los Angeles, Charlie Beck, immediately responded by announcing that the City would no longer honor requests from ICE to turn over nonviolent immigrant offenders with minor criminal records, in effect limiting the applicability of Secure Communities within Los Angeles City limits. 235 This chain of inter-state and intra-state reactions demonstrates the potential "hydraulics" of immigration regulation reform, to borrow Samuel Issacharoff and Pamela Karlan's metaphor for campaign finance reform. 236 With immigration, as with campaign finance, the impetus for reforming the status quo inevitably "has to go somewhere" 237 and in this instance moved from the national stage, to the state level, and ultimately to the local level.
Sanctuary legislation restricting state law enforcement of federal immigration law has thus become an accepted part of the legislative landscape in Alaska, California, Maine, Illinois, Massachusetts, New Mexico, New York, and Oregon, 2 38 despite provisions in the 1996 federal immigration and welfare acts expressly prohibiting local governments from preventing their employees from voluntarily conveying information regarding an individual's immigration status to federal authorities. 239 Challenges to state and local sanctuary laws, based on the relevant clauses of the Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act ("IIRIRA") and the Welfare Reform Act have, however, been unsuccessful. In Sturgeon v. Bratton, 24 0 for example, Californian antiimmigrant activists sought to enjoin Los Angeles's Special Order 40, discussed supra, which precludes officers from inquiring into individuals' immigration statuses or arresting individuals on the suspicion of having committed immigration-related crimes. 2 4 1 Sturgeon, the plaintiff, argued that the Los Angeles Order was preempted by Section 642 of IIRIRA, which provides that governments may not prevent their employees from "[e]xchanging such information with any other Federal, State, or local government entity." 24 2 The California Court of Appeal, however, held that S.O. 40 was not preempted under the doctrines of field, conflict, or obstacle preemption, because the Order governed police actions and arrests, not the sharing with the federal government "has to go somewhere" and "never really disappears into thin air" while also being "part of a broader ecosystem"). of any information that may be obtained during the course of such actions. 24 3 The Court held that Section 642 demonstrated Congress's intent to ensure the voluntary flow of information from states and localities to ICE, and nothing further. 2 44 The Act does not prohibit states and localities from instructing their officers to refrain from obtaining information about immigrants' statuses, and thus federal law did not preempt the L.A.P.D. order. 245 At the heart of the California Court of Appeal's ruling in Sturgeon is a conception of the L.A.P.D. "don't ask" sanctuary policy as a regulation of local police conduct, rather than any kind of local attempt at immigration rulemaking. This seems accurate because, as Bill Ong Hing has argued, the twin goals of almost all sanctuary policies are (1) to promote public safety (by encouraging immigrant victims of crime to come forward) and (2) to preserve economic resources (by limiting police expenditures to non-immigration-related crimes and not expending personnel time on making immigration-related inquiries). 24 6 Thus, as Professor Hing suggests, sanctuary ordinances serve a legitimate state or local purpose and do not "in and of themselves" regulate immigration. 24 7 Sanctuary ordinances are, therefore, conceptually distinct from immigrantexclusionary state immigration enforcement statutes, because, while the former involve states and localities deciding how to marshal their resources to investigate violations of their own criminal laws (without reference to immigration regulation), the latter involve states creating their own exclusionary immigration laws. 248 Under the new framework of immigration federalism created by Arizona v. United States and Chamber of Commerce v. Whiting, it is completely permissible for states and localities to make choices about the allocation of their own resources in ways designed to benefit their residents in the regulation of employer actions, in the investigation of crimes, and in the provision of services to local communities. 24 to create their own additional laws that serve as indirect proxies for federal immigration enforcement.
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The Department of Justice has also acknowledged this important distinction, which has evidently informed its litigation strategy and policy priorities for several years. As Tracy Schmaler, a spokeswoman for the Attorney General, explained at the time that the Arizona suit was filed: "There is a big difference between a state or locality saying they are not going to use their resources to enforce a federal law, as so-called sanctuary cities have done, and a state passing its own immigration policy that actively interferes with federal law." 25 1 In 2007, during the Bush Administration, the Inspector General formally determined that the "don't ask" sanctuary policies of New York City, San Francisco, and the State of Oregon do not conflict with federal law. 2 52 That determination has stood, even while the Obama Department of Justice has vigorously sought to enjoin the state immigration enforcement laws in Arizona, Alabama, Utah, Indiana, Georgia, and South Carolina on the grounds that such legislation is preempted. 2 53 Moreover, the federal government's current policy of under-enforcement with respect to certain "low-risk" classes of undocumented immigrants tracks, in many ways, the determinations made by "sanctuary city" police personnel. 254 As Kit Johnson argued recently, state and local lawmaking to date has been "politically lopsided against immigrants. post-Arizona legislative landscape, as state and local immigrant-inclusionary rulemaking has begun to outstrip immigrant-exclusionary regulations. 257 This increasing vitality of state and city sanctuary laws, and related laws guaranteeing provision of a variety of services to the undocumented, 2 58 combined with a new bipartisan impetus for comprehensive immigration reform, suggest that sanctuary ordinances will endure, and perhaps even flourish, within the new immigration federalism framework. The same can be said of state regulations designed to ameliorate immigrant students' access to education.
B. Education Access Legislation
On June 15, 2012, the thirty-year anniversary of Plyler v. Doe, 2 59 the Department of Homeland Security ("DHS") announced its "Deferred Action for Immigrant Youth" ("DACA") initiative. 260 Under this program, set forth in a memorandum, the DHS exercises its prosecutorial discretion to grant "deferred action" for a renewable period of two years to undocumented immigrants under thirty-one years of age who by June 15, 2012: (1) entered the United States when they were less than sixteen years old; (2) have lived continuously in the United States for at least five years; (3) are in school, are high school graduates, or are military veterans in good standing; and (4) have no criminal record. 26 1 The young immigrant recipients of DACA are able to obtain employment authorization, and thus Social Security numbers, driver's licenses (in some states), and other documentation. 262 Opponents of immigration reform attempted to halt DACA by filing a lawsuit claiming that it constituted an impermissible use of executive powers to subvert the INA-but the challenge 257 See, e.g., NAT'L IMMIGRATION LAW CTR., supra note 11, at 11-13.
258 These services include access to public amenities in New Haven, housing in San Francisco, or medical care in New York. See Schuck, supra note 25, at 389 (noting that the anticipated "race to the bottom" has not occurred and instead numerous states, including those with large immigrant populations, have restored benefits on the state level that had been lost at the federal level, in some instances providing new benefits, including Medicaid); was ultimately unsuccessful. 263 Immigration reformers, in contrast, heralded DACA as bold executive action in the face of legislative inaction, 264 but a less explored, yet equally important, aspect of the genesis of DACA is the role played by the states. For, in the context of access to education, as with the evolution of the sanctuary city movement, the development of various state laws providing educational benefits to noncitizens without regard to their immigration status provided both a blueprint and an impetus for federal action. State laws facilitating access to education for documented and undocumented immigrants, and the interactions between the laws of the various states, as well as between the laws of the states and the law and policy of the federal government, in this area of regulation are a key component of the new immigration federalism. Under federal law, access to higher education for noncitizens has long been stringently regulated. 265 Moreover, under the 1996 immigration and welfare acts, noncitizens' access to a variety of government educational benefits, including loans for undergraduate and graduate studies, is expressly restricted. 266 Nevertheless, individual states "may provide that an alien who is not lawfully present in the United States is eligible for any State or local public benefit for which such alien would otherwise be ineligible ... through the enactment of a State law after August 22, 1996, which affirmatively provides for such eligibility." 267 In accordance with this provision, a number of states have enacted legislation designed to facilitate immigrant inclusion through access to education.
College attendance is widely perceived as a highly effective means of integrating immigrant youth into their new society 26 8 -So much so that it has for the past decade been the cornerstone of a series of federal "DREAM Act" bills presented to Congress seeking to provide undocumented high school students with a potential path to legal status in the United States. 26 9 Most recently, on December 8, 2010 the United States House of Representatives passed H.R. 1751, the Development, Relief, and Education for Alien Minors Act ("DREAM Act"). 270 The Bill had two components. First, it offered a path to citizenship, as an alternative to deportation, for children who entered the United States without inspection when they were aged fifteen or younger, provided that they were "of good moral character" and either completed two years of a fouryear college degree or served for at least two years in the U.S. military. Second, it provided access to higher education funding, particularly federal student loans, for students who would otherwise qualify apart from their undocumented status. 27 1 On December 18, 2010, however, the DREAM Act failed to garner the necessary sixty votes to proceed to a vote on the Senate floor. 272 The failure of the federal DREAM Act was not unprecedented-since 2001, more than five different iterations of the bill have been introduced unsuccessfully. 2 73 In the aftermath of each failed attempt to pass a federal bill, at least one state passed legislation relaxing its own state law restrictions on immigrants' access to state-administered higher education benefits. 274 Thirteen states-state immigrant high school graduates, regardless of immigration status. 284 During the 2011 legislative session, legislators in at least ten other statesArizona, Colorado, Florida, Iowa, Massachusetts, Mississippi, Missouri, New Jersey, Oregon, and Rhode Island-introduced nineteen further bills that would allow undocumented students to receive in-state tuition rates. 285 The opportunity that exists in the post-Arizona "new" immigration federalism for states to engage in immigrant-inclusionary education-related rulemaking is thus hardly a "new" development. But it is nonetheless striking that in the first six months of 2013 alone, so-called "State DREAM Acts," were introduced in sixteen further states, and proposals for greater access to scholarships and/or financial aid for immigrant students were considered in several states. 2 86 The resurgence of such laws in recent months further supports the argument that immigrant-inclusionary rulemaking will define the parameters of the new direction for immigration federalism in the post-Arizona legal landscape.
Indeed, legal challenges to legislation permitting undocumented immigrants to pay in-state tuition rates have, in common with challenges to sanctuary ordinances, thus far proven unsuccessful. In Martinez v. Regents of the University of Calhfornia, 2 87 for example, the California Supreme Court ruled that the California Educational Code provisions governing in-state tuition, as amended by the California DREAM Act, 2 88 were not preempted by federal law. The Court reasoned that the State of California had opted to permit undocumented immigrants to pay in-state tuition rates based on their fulfillment of a number of distinct criteria (namely a California high school diploma, attendance at a California high school for three or more years, and the filing of an affidavit attesting that they intended to attempt to legalize their immigration status) rather than being predicated on residency in the state, and thus the Californian legislation did not conflict with the federal scheme. 2 89 The United States Supreme Court subsequently denied Martinez's petition for certiorari. 290 As with the evolution of the sanctuary movement, the development of these various state laws providing educational benefits to noncitizens without regard to their immigration status hints at the potential "hydraulics" of immigration regulation reform. On each occasion that the federal government failed to pass a DREAM Act, state legislatures introduced their own measures. 29 1 With the publication of the DACA memorandum, drawing upon the successes of the state schemes, the "hydraulics" of rulemaking pertaining to undocumented immigrants' access to education, which had hitherto been visible only in the context of "vertical" or "federal-state" reactions and relationships, also became evident in the "horizontal" federalism context. Now, as lawmakers and advocates are releasing suggestions for comprehensive immigration reform, every single proposal, including Senate Bill S.744 and the White House's "Blueprint for Immigration Reform" 292 involves guaranteeing immigrant youth improved access to education and educational funding. This latest development underscores the dynamism of the new immigration federalism, wherein state legislation intended to foster immigrant inclusion may stand alone, may overlap, or may serve as an inspiration for or a spur to action by other states or by the federal government. defined not by state and local efforts to enforce immigration laws and deport immigrants, but rather by state and local experimentation with measures intended to foster immigrant inclusion. This new framework, which involves the redirection and reorientation of existing rulemaking pertaining to immigrants and immigration as well as the development of novel schemes, has tremendous potential to inform the growing national debate about comprehensive immigration reform. In his State of the Union Address on February 12, 2013, President Obama urged Congress to "get it done," declaring that if lawmakers could send him a comprehensive immigration reform bill in the next few months he would "sign it right away." 294 On June 27, 2013, the Senate Immigration Reform Bill passed with a strong majority (68-32).295 Now, as House legislators get to work they would do well to consider the challenges and opportunities for meaningful action at the federal, state, and local levels.
The new direction for immigration federalism in the aftermath of Arizona and Whiting unquestionably poses both challenges and opportunities for federal and state executives, legislators, and jurists. During the next legislative session, Congress and many state legislatures will undoubtedly consider a range of immigrant-inclusionary and immigrant-exclusionary bills. At the same time, the lower federal courts in Arizona, Utah, Indiana, Georgia, and South Carolina will likely rule on the motions pending before them pertaining to the state independent enforcement statutes. It is also possible that additional lawsuits will be pursued during this period opposing the Illinois and California sanctuary ordinances or the Obama Administration's DACA program. As this Article has attempted to demonstrate, this dynamism and fluidity is an inevitable consequence of the new immigration federalism.
A significant challenge that courts and state legislatures face in the wake of Arizona v. United States is in interpreting the Supreme Court's ruling with respect to Section 2(B) of S.B. 1070, the "show me your papers" provision of the Arizona Act, which the Court acknowledged could be subject to nonfrivolous as-applied equal protection challenges. 2 96 Indeed, after the opinion issued, a number of high-profile individuals, including President Obama, Attorney General Eric Holder, and former Arizona Attorneys General Grant Woods and Terry Goddard, issued statements expressing their concern that the implementation of Section 2(B) might lead to racial profiling. 297 As the Arizona litigation proceeds beyond the preliminary injunction and state officers begin to exercise their S.B. 1070 Section 2(B) powers, allegations of racial profiling may come to the fore. Such allegations, if proven true, would demonstrate that state law enforcement personnel's exercise of their S.B. 1070 Section 2(B) powers was incompatible with both the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution and the theory of state action underpinning the new immigration federalism. State action in the immigration arena is now limited to actions that neither conflict with federal enforcement priorities nor contravene fundamental constitutional rights.
Arizona's example will soon be followed in other jurisdictions. Federal courts in Utah, Indiana, Georgia, and South Carolina are poised, like Alabama, to follow the Supreme Court's Arizona precedent and to allow those states' "show me your papers" provisions to be implemented. Other states, notably Wisconsin, Illinois, Michigan, Pennsylvania, and Ohio, where S.B. 1070-style laws are currently pending, 298 are contemplating laws modeled directly on S.B. 1070 Section 2(B), or laws designed to test the boundaries of the Court's Arizona holding. In each jurisdiction that adopts Section 2(B) style provisions, state and local officers will necessarily become involved in making immigration status inquiries and determinations, leaving states and localities susceptible to claims of racial discrimination, which is incompatible with the new framework of immigration federalism. The challenge for state legislators, going forward, is thus to determine whether the additional expenditure of personnel and resources required by such laws, including the costs of training officers to avoid claims of impermissible racial profiling, combined with the cost of litigating any challenges to the implementation of such laws, is worthwhile. Federal and state courts reviewing such cases will be called upon to distinguish between state officers' "permissible" and "impermissible" consideration of race as a factor under federal and state law. Given the Supreme Court's clear guidance in Arizona and Whiting about the permissible boundaries of state immigrationrelated action within the new framework of immigration federalism, the future of any such "copy-cat" laws will likely be short-lived.
At the same time, federal immigrant-inclusionary developments in 2012-2013, such as the launch of DACA, and the Justice Department's policy of "prioritized enforcement," which were influenced by state DREAM Acts and the sanctuary movement, suggest that now, more than ever, the states have an opportunity to be "laboratories of democracy" for immigrant-inclusionary rulemaking. The flurry of immigrant-inclusionary lawmaking by state legislatures in the first six months of 2013 suggests that (at least some) states have embraced this opportunity to pursue immigrant-inclusive policies that may serve as models for future federal rulemaking. The influence that this state action has had upon the current debate about comprehensive immigration reform should not be underestimated-almost all of the suggestions for reform currently under consideration have been advocated and/or attempted at the state level. The Arizona Court may have reaffirmed the federal government's "broad, undoubted power over the subject of immigration and the status of aliens," 299 and its wide-ranging discretion to pursue (or not pursue) prosecutions for various immigration violations, but in so doing it has also created a landscape within which there is a fresh opportunity for immigrant-inclusionary rulemaking to flourish.
A challenge now for the federal government is to determine the extent to which it wishes to engage formally with the different iterations of state rulemaking pertaining to immigrants. The Department of Homeland Security's decision to sever its Section 287(g) agreements with Arizona 300 suggests that it is unwilling to condone any immigrant-exclusionary state action that does not comport with its own priorities. At the same time, the Department of Justice Inspector General's finding that the New York, San Francisco, and Oregon sanctuary policies do not violate federal law hints at a possible acceptance of immigrant-inclusionary state or local noncooperation policies.
1
Within the post-Arizona, post-Whiting framework of immigration federalism, the challenge for the state and local proponents of such immigrantinclusionary policies, particularly comprehensive sanctuary ordinances, is to ensure that the underlying rationale is to serve a legitimate state or local purpose, not to regulate immigration. 302 As cities like Chicago, and states such as California, attempt to formulate and justify laws and policies designed to further immigrant inclusion, they must ensure that their goal is not to intrude upon the "extensive and complex" 303 federal scheme of immigration regulation, 299Arizona, 132 S. Ct. at 2498. 300 See discussion supra, Parts IV.A-C. 301 See discussion supra, Part V.A. 302 See discussion supra, Part V.A.
303 Arizona, 132 S. Ct. at 2495. but rather to legitimately apportion their own personnel and fiscal resources in orthogonal areas of state law.
In these (and doubtless other) ways, the new immigration federalism will have a profound effect on the legislative and jurisprudential landscape of the United States. Arizona v. United States, Chamber of Commerce v. Whiting, and their inevitable progeny will reshape immigration and alienage jurisprudence, curbing state and local action to exclude immigrants, particularly through independent direct and independent enforcement legislation, while continuing to allow state and local regulations designed to foster the inclusion of immigrant groups. Just how exactly these thoroughgoing changes at the national, state, and local level will influence long-awaited congressional comprehensive immigration reform remains to be seen, 304 but irrespective of how (or indeed whether) Congress ultimately chooses to act, this fundamental change has already begun. 
